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Summary
The article discusses main differences in the EU enlargement strategy/process 
between the one applied for the big-bang Eastern enlargement in 2004/2007 
and the one being used for the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries. 
Within this framework, the article focuses on the key drivers that have con-
tributed to the slowing down of the EU accession process for these countries 
over the last decade. Among others, these drivers include some traditional 
ones, such as lessons from the EU-10 enlargement and general “enlargement 
fatigue” in quite a number of EU member states, as well as a number of more 
recent ones, such as the consequences of the economic crisis, the migrant/
refugee crisis and the Brexit. The reduced appetite of the EU member states 
for Western Balkan enlargement has been reflected in the reshaped EU en-
largement strategy that is now based on the so-called “fundamentals first” 
approach with the rule of law, early resolution of bilateral issues and strength-
ened economic governance as its key pillars. Besides, the enlargement process 
is run today much more on the intergovernmental basis than this was the case 
during the large Eastern enlargement.
Keywords: European Union, EU Enlargements, Western Balkans, Accession, 
Regionalism
I. Introduction
EU enlargements have been one of the most positive achievements of the Euro-
pean integration process.1 With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 
1 This paper has been produced with the support of the German Federal Government through 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH in framework of the 
project “Support to EU Accession Negotiations in Serbia”.
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1990s, a window of opportunity was opened for a far reaching political and eco-
nomic transformation of the European continent. The elimination of the East – West 
divide opened the door for successive enlargements of the EU, first, with the politi-
cally neutral countries in the mid-1990s, and later on with Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries in transition, through the so-called big-bang enlargement in 2004 
(EU-10), followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and finally 
Croatia in 2013.
During this “golden period” of EU enlargement policy, the relationship of the 
EU and the Western Balkan region (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Ma-
cedonia, Montenegro, Albania) was marked by the quest for a defining policy that 
would have as its first aim the full stabilization of the region. The reason for this 
was the 1990’s dissolution of former SFRY, and unsolved issues among its succes-
sors. The Stabilization and Association Policy (SAP) was created in 1999, and this 
policy used models and instruments that were created for the purpose of preparing 
CEE countries for EU membership; of course, SAP has adjusted those models and 
instruments for the specific situation of WB countries.
In contrast to the rather expeditious big-bang Eastern enlargement of 2004, 
with its completion in 2007, the Western Balkan enlargement, with the notable ex-
ception of Croatia has been increasingly delayed. The main objectives of this paper 
are twofold, first, to analyze the key drivers that have contributed to the slowing 
down of the EU accession process for the countries from the Western Balkan re-
gion over the last decade, and second, to present and discuss differences in the EU 
enlargement strategy/process between the one applied for the big-bang Eastern en-
largement in 2004/2007 and the one being used for the EU accession of the Western 
Balkan countries.
In addition to the Introduction and Conclusion, the paper consists of three main 
sections. The second section focuses on key features of the 2004/2007 big-bang 
Eastern enlargement (EU-10 enlargement). This section also provides an insight 
into the broader political and economic environment that accompanied the EU-10 
enlargement process. The third section is aimed at discussing main drivers that have 
been behind the slowing down of the EU accession process for the Western Bal-
kan countries. Among others, these drivers include some traditional ones, such as 
lessons from the EU-10 enlargement and general “enlargement fatigue” in quite a 
number of EU member states, as well as a number of more recent ones, such as the 
consequences of the economic crisis, the migrant/refugee crisis and Brexit. The 
fourth section discusses how the reduced appetite of EU member states in the period 
since the big-bang enlargement in 2004 has shaped EU enlargement strategy for the 
Western Balkan countries.
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II. Key Features Behind the 2004/2007 Eastern Enlargement
II.1. Specifics of the Eastern Enlargement vis-a-vis the Previous Ones 
The Eastern enlargement was in a strictly formal sense modeled on previous en-
largements. Similar to previous enlargement episodes, this enlargement pursued 
two strategic objectives, a political one and an economic one, and similarly to pre-
vious enlargements, the Eastern enlargement was based on the same legal basis and 
was subject of the negotiations about the terms and conditions candidate countries 
need to fulfill in order to join the EU.
Nevertheless, the Eastern enlargement was in many fundamental elements very 
different from previous ones, either the Southern enlargements of the 1980s or the 
EU enlargement with three former EFTA countries in the 1990s. One big difference 
was that never before had the EU negotiated with so many candidate countries si-
multaneously and never before had the negotiations been extended for such a long 
time. Further on, never before had the accession negotiations been based on explicit 
accession criteria articulated in the form of the Copenhagen criteria, and they had 
never included such a long list of measures to be implemented by the candidate 
countries prior to accession, organized in, at that time, 31 negotiation chapters. On 
the side of EU member states, the Eastern enlargement represented unprecedented 
institutional challenges as the increase from 15 to 25 (27) members required a ma-
jor recalibration of the decision-making rules in EU institutions. The enlargement 
with around 100 million new EU citizens contributing less than 5 percent to the 
overall EU GDP presented a major challenge for some of the EU policies as well 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 20). It is for this reason that EU member 
states requested a number of transition periods in the most sensitive areas, such as 
the free movement of labor, agriculture and cohesion policy. For the free movement 
of labor, a 7-year transition period was agreed to, while the full participation of new 
member states in the Common Agricultural Policy was, with respect to direct pay-
ments, achieved only after a 10-year long transition period. As far as the cohesion 
policy is concerned, a de-facto transition period was experienced primarily by more 
developed new member states, especially Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Malta, 
in the period from 2004 to 2006 due to the limited amount of funds allocated for en-
largement under the Agenda 2000 medium-term financial perspective covering the 
period between 2000 and 2006.
II.2. Political and Geo-Strategic Aspects of the Eastern Enlargement...
In contrast to the enlargement with the EFTA countries in the 1990s, the Eastern 
enlargement was strongly based on political and, for the EU member states, also 
geo-strategic considerations. For the new democracies from Eastern Europe, inte-
gration into Euro-Atlantic integration, primarily the EU and NATO, was on the top 
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of their political agenda while for the EU member states, the Eastern enlargement 
was aimed primarily at promoting the political stability of newly established de-
mocracies in the eastern part of the continent and at strengthening the international 
influence of the enlarged EU. 
Strong geopolitical considerations of the EU member states associated with the 
decisions about Eastern enlargement had two aspects. One was the timing aspect. 
The 1993 Copenhagen European Council decision to enlarge in the East was strong-
ly influenced by the fears that the transition process in ex-communist countries may 
stall, as well as by the outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. Another as-
pect supporting strongly the geopolitical character of the Eastern enlargement was 
the readiness of the EU to reconsider its enlargement strategy. While the EU, at its 
1997 Luxembourg European Council, decided to launch the EU accession negotia-
tions with only 5 Eastern European countries, at the 1999 Helsinki European Coun-
cil the decision was revised. In the context of the Kosovo crisis, the EU member 
states decided to start the negotiations with another 5 countries from the region that 
just two years before had been assessed as unprepared for negotiations. 
A strong geopolitical motivation of the Eastern enlargement from the perspec-
tive of the EU member states was more than obvious throughout the process of the 
negotiations. For example, member states and EU institutions were rather benevo-
lent in the interpretation of the Copenhagen criteria. This applies both to the politi-
cal and economic criteria as well as to the acquis criteria. As far as the assessment of 
the latter is concerned, a stronger focus was made on the harmonization of national 
legislations than on their implementation. Even though the negotiation process was 
run by the European Commission in technical terms, the member states were firmly 
in the driving seat of the process. The rotating presidency was giving the tone to the 
dynamics of the convoy negotiation process and the European Council was ready to 
adopt all those politically sensitive decisions that were needed to complete the ne-
gotiations in an expeditious manner. A typical example of this kind is the Copenha-
gen European Council decision from December 2002. Even though the negotiations 
started with the Luxembourg group, i.e., the group of better fitting candidates, much 
earlier than with the Helsinki group, i.e., the group considered at that time as less 
fit, and even though the “own merits” principle was in place, the negotiations were 
completed for both groups at the same time.2 The very fact that the less fit candidate 
countries as a group needed less time to meet all Copenhagen criteria and finished 
2 At the 2002 Copenhagen European Council, the EU accession negotiations were completed 
with 10 out 12 candidate countries while for the remaining two, Bulgaria and Romania, a com-
mitment was made by the EU member states to bring the two countries into the full membership 
in 2007 or 2008. 
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the negotiations earlier that the candidates with a better starting position in the ne-
gotiations confirms the strong political character of the process.
II.3. ... and Economic Aspects
The Eastern enlargement had a strong economic dimension as well. The enlarge-
ment was happening in the environment where the EU made important decisions 
about the deepening of its integration process. With the transformation of the EU 
from a customs union into an area of four freedoms in the early 1990s, each succes-
sive enlargement of the EU had its own strong economic logic. This applied to the 
1995 enlargement with Austria, Finland and Sweden and even more so to the 2004 
Eastern enlargement with 10 countries and its completion in 2007 when Bulgaria 
and Romania also became full members. 
From the perspective of Eastern European aspirants and later on candidate 
countries, the process of the EU accession was viewed as a useful tool for speeding 
up the transition process. Clearly determined commitments on the side of candi-
dates accompanied with a precise timetable of the course of the EU accession ne-
gotiations had mobilized policy makers and the public at large for the effective im-
plementation of tasks. The process was strongly supported by various instruments 
of pre-accession financial assistance geared specifically to the accession objectives, 
on the one hand, to the effective harmonization to the acquis, and on the other hand, 
to the effective preparation of the candidate for efficient use of cohesion funds once 
the country would become a member state. 
The process of Eastern enlargement which in institutional terms started with 
the Association or Europe Agreements signed in early 1990 provided a legal frame-
work for strengthening economic cooperation between the candidates and the EU 
member states. The latter became the destination for an increasing proportion of 
the exports from Eastern Europe and the EU member states became by far the most 
important source of foreign direct investment. In time and based on increasing eco-
nomic integration with Western Europe, both in terms of trade and investment, the 
candidate countries started to generate economic growth that was much higher than 
in the EU member states and to reduce the development gap vis-a-vis the member 
states.
Despite some affirmations to the contrary, the Eastern enlargement had a 
strongly beneficial economic impact on the EU member states as well. The quickly 
growing candidate countries had namely become important markets for goods and 
services from EU members. In the period just before the accession, they had a bila-
teral overall surplus with all the new member states. Almost all Central and Eastern 
European countries were individually in deficit vis-a-vis the EU-15 (Landaburu, 
2007: 13). As a group, the Eastern European candidate countries represented the 
second most important trading partner for the EU (Verhaugen, 2007: 3). 
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Companies from the EU did not only sell their goods and services in Eastern 
European candidate countries, they also bought existing businesses and launched 
entirely new ones with the effect of a significant amount of job creation. Between 
1990 and 2004, countries of the region benefited from FDI worth more than 100 bil-
lion EUR. In the last years prior to accession, FDI from EU member states equiva-
lent to around 20 billion EUR a year were flowing into Central and Eastern Europe 
with a large majority of the investment channeled into the four Visegrad countries, 
especially Poland (Landaburu, 2007: 13). The trade creation effects of the East-
ern enlargement outweighed those of trade diversion within the EU members and 
therefore boosted the overall economic standing of the EU in the world economy 
vis-a-vis both traditional competitors, such as US and Japan, and emerging econo-
mies, such as China and India (O’Brennan, 2006: 133). With its close to 500 million 
customers, the EU, enlarged with Eastern European countries, became the largest 
market in the world. And finally, the Eastern enlargement boosted significantly the 
negotiating power of the EU on the global economic scene, and in particular within 
the WTO. 
III. Drivers Behind the Slowing Down of the EU Accession Process 
       for Western Balkans
III.1. Lessons from the 2004/2007 Eastern Enlargement
The Eastern enlargement enjoyed a top priority status of the EU member states dur-
ing the 1990s and the early 2000s. To what extent the enlargement was success-
ful depends on the criteria for evaluating this policy. If assessed through the optic 
of security, stability and economic prosperity for both the old and new EU mem-
ber states, the pre-accession period of the Eastern enlargement may be considered 
largely successful. For the post-accession period where enlargement is considered 
to be successful if it leads to the harmonious integration of new members and al-
lows EU institutions and policies to function correctly, this assessment is less posi-
tive and in some circles even negative (Avery, 2015: 13). On the other hand, the Eu-
ropean Commission in its report on the economic developments after the big-bang 
Enlargement speaks of its huge economic benefits (European Commission Report 
on Enlargement, Five Years Later, 2009: 5).
It is not surprising that lessons from the 2004/2007 Eastern enlargement, espe-
cially the less positive ones, have had an important impact on the Western Balkan 
enlargement process. One of important negative lessons was a political one related 
to the accession of Cyprus as a divided state. Although the Copenhagen criteria do 
not address the subject of national borders, EU member states have become signifi-
cantly more attentive to the issue of unresolved border issues. Even more so after the 
border dispute between Slovenia as an EU member state and Croatia as a candidate 
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country, and taking into account that there are numerous unresolved border issues in 
practically all the Western Balkan states. The Serbia-Kosovo issue as well as Bos-
nia and Herzegovina’s institutional structure are particularly difficult in this context.
Another important lesson from the 2004 and especially the 2007 enlargement 
was that conditionality with respect to the Copenhagen criteria has to be implement-
ed in a more comprehensive and strict manner than was the case during the Eastern 
enlargement process. It namely became more than obvious that the back-loading of 
more difficult negotiating chapters with strong political sensibility, especially the 
one related to the judiciary, backfired quickly after the accession. The cases of Bul-
garia and Romania were highly illustrative in this respect.
Deficiencies were detected also with respect to the fulfillment of the acquis 
criteria. In the pre-accession period, the candidate countries were rather successful 
in harmonizing their national legislations with the EU legal system. Unfortunately, 
the implementation was very often lagging behind. This explains why the enlarge-
ment process for Western Balkan countries has become much more structured than 
before with a number of checkpoints introduced in various stages of the negotiation 
process. In addition, the EU member states have also learned from this that setting 
early deadlines for the completion of the negotiation may reduce the incentive for 
the candidate country to proceed with the reforms and adjustment. There is no in-
strument to push for the reforms once a country becomes a member state, and this is 
one of the reasons why the EU now insists much more on conditionality.
III.2. Enlargement Fatigue
Another set of drivers behind the slowing down of the EU accession process after 
the Eastern enlargement is closely interrelated with the above discussed Eastern en-
largement lessons, and has a common denomination in what is called “enlargement 
fatigue”. Though the concept is not new as it already emerged for the first time dur-
ing the 1960s in the context of the first EU enlargement and surfaced again in the 
context of the Southern enlargement in the 1980s and the Eastern enlargement at 
the turn of the century, enlargement fatigue gained a strong political meaning with 
the failure of the 2005 French and Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. 
Though the Eastern enlargement was not the cause for the failure of the referen-
dums, it provided a convenient scapegoat for the rejection and the notion that the 
European integration project was run by elites.
The perceived public opposition to further enlargements has been increasingly 
integrated into the official EU enlargement policies of old member states. In France, 
for example, it became compulsory to hold a referendum on further enlargements, 
unless the endorsement is reached with a demanding 60 percent majority of the two 
houses of their parliament. Or in Germany and Austria, there was an open discus-
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sion whether negotiations with Turkey should end with full accession or in a kind 
of a privileged partnership only (Sedelmeier, 2014: 6).
The enlargement fatigue sentiment was gaining further ground after the EU ac-
cession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. It was sometimes claimed the EU could 
not afford to accept any more institutionally weak states, which has unfortunately 
been a characteristic of several Western Balkan states aspiring to become members 
of the EU. With the justification that the EU has to introduce institutional changes 
before any further enlargement, the failure of the Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum 
in 2008 contributed its part to the slowing down of the EU enlargement dynamics 
towards the Western Balkans.
As explained in the 2015 report on The Western Balkans and EU enlargement 
by the Directorate General for External Policies, opinion polls, which also serve 
as an important guide for political decision-making, display growing scepticism 
among European citizens in many member states towards a further widening of the 
EU. The perceived high levels of immigration from the states that joined in 2004 as 
well as refugees and asylum seekers arriving through and from the Western Balkan 
countries have contributed to this trend as well. It is possible that some of this dis-
approval is directed at Turkey, also languishing in the EU’s waiting room. Finally, 
reports of legal uncertainty, corruption, and increasing poverty in the Western Bal-
kans affect public perceptions in the EU countries, and these perceptions influence 
internal decision-making regarding potential enlargement.
III.3. The Economic and Migrant Crises and Their Management
As presented in the previous sub-section, the reluctance towards the Western Bal-
kan enlargement was initiated well before the start of the global and euro-area eco-
nomic and refugee crises, but it has intensified significantly since then. There are 
at least two mutually reinforcing explanations for this development. One of them 
is the very fact that EU member states have become increasingly preoccupied with 
their internal problems, primarily with how to manage the twin crises and more re-
cently also with how to address the Brexit issue. As a consequence, the importance 
of enlargement has been minimized on the political agenda of the EU. Another ex-
planation for growing enlargement fatigue in recent years is the way in which the 
two crises have been managed. Developments over the recent years have shown 
that in the crises management process the relative power of the European Commis-
sion, which has traditionally been a strong supporter of EU enlargements, has been 
weakened, and consequently the position of the European Council and member 
states has been boosted. 
The change of power between the member states and the EU institutions that 
evolved over recent years has been increasingly reflected in the enlargement dos-
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sier as well. Today, the enlargement process is run more on the intergovernmental 
basis than was the case during the large Eastern enlargement. The European Com-
mission continues to play a central bureaucratic role in the enlargement process, but 
the role of the member states, through the Council and the European Council, has 
become more explicit and direct. The Council rather that the European Commis-
sion is increasingly setting the benchmarks for the negotiations and what de-facto 
determines the pace of the negotiation process. In contrast to previous enlarge-
ments, where the process had been largely run on its own, rational and normative 
decision-making logic, the Western Balkan enlargement process is subject to in-
creased politicization and a growing number of bilateral conditions that would have 
previously been considered inappropriate (O’Brennan, 2013: 39). The growing role 
of member states in the negotiation process is well summarized in the following 
quote: “... increased national safeguards and mechanisms to steer and control the 
conduct of enlargement; increased ‘intergovernmentalisation’ in the sense that the 
General Affairs Council and the European Council assume a more decisive role in 
decision-making on enlargement, often overruling or ignoring the Commission’s 
opinion; and the growing influence of domestic politics at key moments of the en-
largement process and over outcomes in the dossier” (Balfour and Stratulat, 2015: 
xiii).
A very remarkable shift in the institutional arrangement of the EU enlargement 
process has happened also with respect to the European Commission’s approach 
towards this subject. Though the European Commission has traditionally been a 
strong promotor of the EU enlargements, this can hardly be said for the Junker 
Commission. The watering down of the enlargement topic in the European Com-
mission’s agenda can be illustrated in several ways. One is the statement of Mr. Jun-
ker at the beginning of his mandate that there would be no EU accession during the 
term of this European Commission. Though he said something that was obvious,3 
the statement still sent a message of a political choice heard primarily among poli-
ticians and the public at large in EU member states. Another illustration deals with 
the institutional changes within the European Commission where enlargement lost 
its own commissioner and Directorate General (DG) enlargement was renamed into 
DG neighborhood policy and enlargement, giving a clear signal about the priority 
of political choices (Hillion, 2015: 26).
3 Even under the most optimistic scenario, none of the Western Balkan countries could become 
an EU member by 2019. This would namely imply that the accession negotiations would have to 
be completed by the end of 2017 and that was not realistic under any scenario. 
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IV. Revised Strategy for the EU Accession of the Western Balkans 
      and Its Implementation
IV.1. The Same Legal Basis and Formal Criteria for Enlargement 
        but with a More Rigorous Interpretation
At the 2003 Thessaloniki European Council, the EU member states made a clear 
commitment to the political future of the Western Balkans, ensuring that the re-
gion’s future was within the EU. Similar to previous Eastern enlargements, the legal 
basis for accession is Article 49 of the TEU, and similar to those enlargements, the 
conditions for accession of the aspirant countries are determined in the Copenha-
gen criteria. These criteria do remain the conceptual backbone for the EU accession 
of the Western Balkans. The problem, however, is that the criteria have never been 
articulated precisely and therefore they allow differences in interpretation. Further-
more, the criteria cannot be interpreted as a primarily legal and/or technical matter, 
but also as a matter of how EU values and policies are established and implemented. 
In the context of the 2004/2007 Eastern enlargement and the forthcoming ac-
cession with Croatia (and Turkey) and taking into account the changed political atti-
tude of many member states towards further EU enlargements, the European Com-
mission revised its Enlargement Strategy in November 2006. The document repeats 
the political commitments of the EU to the Western Balkans, reiterating that each 
country has the potential to become an EU member once it fulfills the necessary 
conditions. The crucial element of this revised strategy is encapsulated in the last 
part of this sentence, meaning basically that a Western Balkan country will enter the 
EU “once it fulfills the necessary conditions”. The issue here is not the wording. It 
has always been the case that candidate countries were required to meet accession 
conditions. The difference lies in the substance of this phrase. “Fulfilling necessary 
conditions” can be interpreted in various ways. During the Eastern enlargement, 
it was interpreted rather benevolently, due to the strong pro-enlargement political 
commitment of the member states and the “convoy” type of negotiations. After this 
enlargement, there was a growing belief that significant challenges that needed to 
be tackled remained in some new and prospective members in the areas of the rule 
of law, and activities against organized crime and corruption. The new approach/
strategy also reiterated the need for more rigorous conditionality and greater em-
phasis on the EU’s absorption capacity, i.e., its capacity to accept new members, 
in accession negotiations (Review of the Balance of Competences, 2014: 28). As a 
result of the growing nationalization of EU Enlargement Policy, the role of the na-
tional parliaments of the Member States has also grown. Though, it is important to 
notice that this is a trend that has coincided with the increased role of national par-
liaments in creating EU public policies in general.
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Though the new approach towards EU enlargement is a natural result of the 
experience gained from previous enlargements of the Union, it is also largely based 
on the understanding that the EU is above all a community of values, not just a 
common market. The rule of law, particularly the protection of fundamental rights 
is a prerequisite for the legitimacy of the EU, which goes far beyond economic and 
political integration. Within these issues that are now of such importance to the ne-
gotiations, it is considered that there are nine norms that are significant to European 
values – five basic norms (peace, the idea of freedom, democracy, rule of law and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms) and four “lesser” norms (so-
cial solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance) 
(Manners, 2007: 242).
Further on, the new approach towards Western Balkan enlargement also re-
flects the region’s specific political reality after the wars on the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. One important ingredient of the EU enlargement 
strategy for the Western Balkans is its regional component conceptualized in the 
Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA). In contrast to similar arrange-
ments of this type signed between the EU and countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe in the early 1990s (they were called Accession or Europe Agreements), the 
SAAs of the Western Balkan countries have a strong regional dimension. The re-
gional dimension of the Western Balkan enlargement strategy has as its main objec-
tive to strengthen stabilization and regional cooperation, and to improve neighborly 
relations among countries of the region. Another important specific of the Western 
Balkan enlargement strategy is its requirement for full cooperation of the countries 
from the region with the ICTY and the return of refugees. The component called the 
“Copenhagen Plus” encompasses also a strong security dimension and is aimed pri-
marily at the implementation of various political and peace agreements stemming 
from the developments in the 1990s (Kmezić, 2015: 13).
The new approach for the EU enlargement of the Western Balkan countries 
was initially articulated in the 2006 enlargement strategy (its main elements are 
presented in sub-section IV.2) and the conditionality was further developed in the 
2013 and 2014 enlargement strategies based on the newly introduced “fundamen-
tals first” pillars, which encompass, in addition to the rule of law, the early resolu-
tion of bilateral issues (sub-chapter IV.3), the importance of economic governance 
(sub-section IV.4) and public administration reform (sub-section IV.5). The final 
part of this section presents the main changes that have been introduced into the 
pre-accession financial instrument as a reflection of the revised EU strategy towards 
enlargement (sub-section IV.6).
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IV.2. Key Elements of the “New Approach to EU Negotiations”
What is now called the “New Approach to EU Negotiations” actually started to 
take shape during Croatia’s EU accession negotiations.4 Its first and very impor-
tant innovation was the introduction of benchmarks into the negotiating process 
aimed at strengthening the monitoring of the negotiation. Benchmarks are required 
to be met in order to either open negotiations on a particular chapter (“opening 
benchmarks”) or to provisionally close the negotiating process on that very chapter 
(“closing benchmarks”). The benchmarks were actually used for the first time for 
the opening of negotiations with Montenegro in 2011. Since then, benchmarks have 
become an integral part of every chapter of negotiations and have de-facto become 
an important instrument for a more structured approach to the negotiations.
The new approach introduced another fundamental novelty in the negotiating 
process. In previous enlargement negotiations chapters addressing the political cri-
teria, such as the rule of law, were opened quite late within the process. As a con-
sequence and as experience shows, they had often been closed prematurely within 
the context of the political pressure to finalize the negotiation process. Based on 
the conclusion that meeting the political criteria usually takes a very long time to 
achieve, the EU decided that reforms of the candidate countries in these areas need 
to be “front-loaded”. This means that the candidates must embark on an ambitious 
reform program in this area from the very beginning of the negotiations. As agreed 
in 2011, this new approach stipulates that the rule of law conditionality elaborated 
in chapter 23 (judicial reform, the fight against corruption and human and minority 
rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) must be tackled from the be-
ginning of the negotiations. This in practice means that these two chapters are now 
the first ones to be opened and also the last ones to be closed. This approach aims 
at providing candidate countries with sufficient time to introduce the reforms, both 
through the harmonization of the legislation and by demonstrating a strong track 
record of implementation, before negotiations close.
The negotiations on these two chapters have been de-facto given the role of 
“controller” of the negotiations. The new approach namely introduces the so-called 
“imbalance clause”, which stipulates that any delay in implementing the obligations 
under these two chapters may lead to the activation of a mechanism that halts nego-
tiations on all the chapters. Further on, apart from “opening” and “closing bench-
marks”, the negotiations on these two chapters are also subject to so-called “interim 
benchmarks”, which are also defined to evaluate the consistency with which align-
ment within the area of the rule of law is achieved. The introduction of the “imba-
lance clause” as well as of “interim benchmarks” is just more evidence of how the 
4 The text of this sub-section is based on Miščević, 2016.
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negotiations are increasingly shaped by the EU member states, as they just decide 
whether the benchmarks have been met or not. Finally, the benchmarks are becom-
ing more numerous. As an example, one can note that Montenegro has twice as 
many “interim benchmarks” in chapters 23 and 24 than was the total number of all 
benchmarks in Croatia’s EU accession negotiations. It can be concluded, in fact, 
that each step taken in the negotiating process is now far more difficult and politi-
cized than ever before.
In the case of Serbia, there is another unique feature that has been introduced 
into the negotiation process. It refers to chapter 35. This chapter usually covers is-
sues such as the new acquis that entered into force in various chapters after the ne-
gotiations were temporarily closed, access to various special bodies of the EU as 
well as special arrangements for specific countries (for example, trade regime in the 
Neum corridor for Croatia).
In the case of Serbia, however, this chapter has been turned into a mechanism 
for monitoring all the agreements, those that have been achieved and the future 
ones, concluded as a result of the dialogue on the normalization of relations be-
tween Belgrade and Pristina. This chapter has the same status in the negotiating 
process as the ones concerning the rule of law. It therefore incorporates “transitional 
criteria” and may activate the “imbalance clause” if it is assessed that there is no 
sufficient progress in the implementation of the agreements. It is not clear at this 
point what criteria will be used to assess whether sufficient headway has been made 
in meeting the obligations arising from the chapter. As the substance chapter is 
completely new, with no earlier experience not only for Serbia as a candidate coun-
try but also for the EU institutions (the EEAS and the European Commission) and 
the member states, it is realistic to expect that it will be one of the most challeng-
ing chapters in the overall negotiation process for this country. What is clear at this 
point are the basic principles of chapter 35. It cannot be a substitute for dialogue and 
is only a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of what has been agreed 
to in the dialogue. Further on, the framework of the chapter must not exceed the 
framework of dialogue, and cannot go outside of the framework of the agreements 
that have already been reached. This means that chapter 35 is not meant to broaden 
the topics related to normalization into new areas. This can be done through the dia-
logue exclusively.
IV.3. “Fundamentals First” Approach – Part 1: Early Resolution
         of Bilateral Disputes 
The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia that went through a period of severe hos-
tilities and wars in the 1990s has resulted in the creation of several sovereign states 
on this territory. As the borders of the republics of that predecessor state had never 
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been formally established, this opened the door for disputes among the neighboring 
states about the borders. The first large dispute of this kind among the ex-Yugoslav 
republics, and one that had a strong implication on the EU accession process was 
the one between Slovenia, at that time already an EU member state, and Croatia as 
a candidate country. The dispute escalated to the point where Slovenia temporarily 
blocked the EU accession negotiations of its neighbor. This in fact meant that an EU 
member state was using the EU accession negotiations of its neighboring country as 
leverage for addressing bilateral disputes. 
The case of the Slovenia-Croatia dispute and its disruptive impact on the EU 
enlargement process as a whole has indicated very clearly that bilateral condition-
ality may become a major obstacle for the EU accession of other countries in the 
Western Balkans. This is not only because of a large number of potential disputes 
as many of the border issues between the Western Balkan states remain unresolved, 
but also because there are now many more decision points for the member states at 
which they could put pressure upon a candidate. Though unresolved border issues 
between the Western Balkan countries are potentially very problematic for effective 
EU enlargement process of the countries in the region, they are not the only ones. 
There are other unresolved issues with a potentially disruptive role as well, such as 
the name dispute in the case of Macedonia, the status of Kosovo, and the institu-
tional setting of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Based on the experience from the Slovenia-Croatia border case, the 2013 en-
largement strategy calls for addressing the expected bilateral issues among the 
Western Balkan countries as early as possible in the accession process so as to 
avoid turning them into an obstacle in the EU accession negotiations at a later stage. 
The EU institutions are expected to provide pro-active mediation in these processes. 
IV.4. “Fundamentals First” Approach – Part 2: Economic Governance 
In the decades prior to the economic crisis, European economic governance had a 
rather limited impact on the EU accession process.5 Countries in the process of EU 
accession were asked to enter in the so-called “pre-accession fiscal surveillance”. 
This consisted of two components. The first was a policy dialogue on medium-
term policy framework (primarily on macroeconomic and fiscal issues) based on 
so-called Pre-accession Economic Programmes for official candidate countries and 
Economic and Fiscal Programmes for potential candidate countries. The second 
component of the “surveillance” consisted of fiscal notifications. As far as EU ac-
cession negotiations are concerned, European economic governance issues were 
considered as a rather “light” and uncomplicated negotiations subject. Acquis in 
5 The text of this sub-section is based on Mrak, 2015.
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this area was very limited and largely focused on issues associated with the central 
bank independence.
During the economic crisis it has become obvious that a sustainable monetary 
union, due to the high level of economic dependency among the members, requires 
stricter rules of their implementation than in the case of EU members. There is no 
doubt that the “six-pack”, the “two-pack”, the Fiscal Compact and the European 
Stability Mechanism do contain the most far-reaching legal reforms of the fiscal 
governance framework since the introduction of the single currency. The introduc-
tion of these legal acts has, however, contributed to a drastic transformation of the 
EU/euro area economic governance from a rather simple one into a very complex 
one. 
A significantly strengthened acquis in the economic governance area and in 
particular the fact that Croatia was placed into the excessive budget and excessive 
imbalance procedures soon after its accession into the EU triggered the decision of 
the EU member states that more attention in the EU accession process has to be at-
tached to economic governance. Through the 2014 EU enlargement strategy, it was 
constituted as one of the fundamental first pillars. 
The reformed European economic governance has been trickling down into 
the EU accession process through two main channels. The first one is a broadened 
framework for consultation on economic policy coordination. While before the cri-
sis this framework was largely focused on macro and fiscal issues, it now encom-
passes in a much more systemic manner also growth and competitiveness issues. In 
2014, the candidate countries were asked for the first time to produce a document 
called the Economic Reform Programme (ERP) which, in fact, represents the new 
generation of document supporting economic policy dialogue between a candidate 
country and the European Union. Also the procedure for assessing this document 
has been strengthened. Now, the annual cycle of the consultation ends with a mi-
nisterial meeting, in the ECOFIN format, where country-specific recommendations 
are adopted for each of the EU candidates. 
The second channel for strengthening economic governance in EU candidate 
countries is a broadened scope for acquis harmonization within chapter 17 of the 
EU accession negotiations. In contrast to the pre-crisis period, the acquis chapter 
on economic and monetary policy, now chapter 17, has become much broader co-
vering numerous economic governance issues. Negotiations under this chapter have 
become increasingly and more explicitly linked with the fulfillment of the Copen-
hagen economic criteria. From a candidate country’s point of view, the crucial ele-
ment for successful negotiations on this chapter is good cooperation between the 
central bank and the ministry of finance. The role of the latter with respect to this 
chapter of the negotiations has increased significantly. 
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IV.5. “Fundamentals First” Approach – Part 3: Public Administration Reforms 
Reform of public administration is another big area that gained increased impor-
tance under the “fundamentals first” approach. The experience from previous en-
largements as well as from the recent economic crisis has shown that there is no 
economic development without a well-functioning public administration. Conse-
quently, there is a strong need for a more systemic approach towards reforming the 
public administration. A comprehensive approach is needed in order to create an 
administrative apparatus that will have not only the capacity to negotiate, but also 
the ability to implement everything that has been agreed on. Such an administrative 
apparatus, not only on a national level, but also on a local or regional one, must be 
ready to meet all the requirements that come from EU membership once the country 
becomes a member, when all EU policies become a part of its national public poli-
cies (Miščević, 2016: 80).
The main elements of the public administration reform within the EU acces-
sion process are the following: first, a comprehensive public administration reform 
that consists of five separate but interlinked and mutually reinforced dimensions 
(public service and human resource management, policy development and coordi-
nation, public financial management, accountability and service delivery) and the 
strategic framework that addresses all five separate dimensions. Second, a more 
evidence-based approach to public administration reform (based on SIGMA and 
OECD baseline measurements). Third, comparative reporting in the annual reports 
(on each of the five separate dimensions and on the sixth one that is of a cross-
cutting nature). Fourth, structured policy dialogue (regular policy dialogue on in-
dividual dimensions though SAA structures). And fifth, mainstreaming of public 
administration reform (aims to ensure that EU sectoral assistance does not create 
unsustainable “islands of excellence”, but respects general public administration 
reform efforts and promotes key principles of public administration development) 
(Brunet, 2016). 
IV.6. IPA II as a New Generation of a Pre-Accession Financial Assistance 
        Instrument Adjusted to the Revised EU Enlargement Strategy
The changed political climate among EU member states towards the Western Bal-
kan enlargement reflected in significant revisions of the EU enlargement strategy 
over the last decade got its response also in the IPA II as the new generation of pre-
accession financial assistance instrument.6 Its overall philosophy is to continue with 
the provision of the pre-accession financial assistance, but the assistance should be, 
in line with the “fundamentals first” approach of the revised EU enlargement stra-
6 The text of this sub-section is based on Mrak, 2016.
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tegy, less focused on narrowly defined EU accession objectives and more on ge-
neral socio-economic and good governance objectives (Koeth, 2014: 14).
Even though general objectives and areas of intervention of the IPA II are con-
ceptually not very different from the IPA I and in this respect represent its continu-
ation, the revised IPA instrument is still very different from the IPA I in several fea-
tures, and each of these new features is consistent with the revised philosophy of the 
2014-2020 pre-accession instrument. 
One novelty of the IPA II is undifferentiated access to funds meaning that the 
status of all the candidate countries is the same. There is no distinction between can-
didates and potential candidates. This seems logical under the circumstances when 
the EU enlargement agenda is increasingly unclear in terms of the timetable. Expe-
riences over the last decade clearly indicate that being a candidate country does not 
necessarily mean that a country is closer to membership status. Macedonia, which 
has been a candidate country for 10 years, but has not even started the EU accession 
negotiations, well illustrates this point.
Also, the structures for managing the IPA II funds are significantly different 
from the ones under the IPA I. As following the “fundamentals first” approach, the 
IPA II has departed from narrowly designed accession-driven objectives towards 
more general development and good governance objectives, it is logical that this 
has been reflected in the adjusted structures for managing these funds. Under the 
IPA I, the focus of these strongly accession-driven structures were EU-accredited 
institutions aimed primarily at preparing the candidates for effective absorption of 
EU funds after the accession. Under the IPA II, however, these management and im-
plementation structures are largely adjusted to the general development and good 
governance objectives of each individual candidate country.
The third novelty of the IPA II is the introduction of the so-called sector ap-
proach. A provision of the assistance based on the sector approach is in sharp con-
trast to earlier versions of pre-accession instruments, including the IPA, where 
assistance to the EU candidate countries was implemented through numerous in-
dividual projects covering a large number of thematic priorities. This project-by-
project approach was, indeed, sub-optimal as stand-alone projects – even in circum-
stances of being managed well and having met their narrowly defined objectives 
– had only limited sectoral or even national policy relevance and impact. The sec-
tor approach introduced under the IPA II has been aimed primarily at addressing 
these deficiencies. There is little doubt that the sector approach has many positive 
sides, as it strengthens ownership of the beneficiary over the project, links better 
individual projects with national and sectoral priorities, and provides a framework 
for better coordination with other donors. However, the approach is associated with 
potential disadvantages as well. This may be less the case for the candidates that are 
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still far away from the membership, but the disadvantages are more obvious for the 
candidates closer to EU accession. For them, moving funds away from specific EU 
accession projects namely increases risks that these countries will not be well pre-
pared, first, for assuming obligations under the acquis, and second, for absorbing 
the large volume of EU funds they will be entitled to upon the accession. 
And finally, closely associated with the sector approach is another novelty of 
the IPA II, namely the introduction of the sector budget support instrument. The 
instrument – it was used extensively in delivering EU development assistance in 
previous decades and as an exception also under the IPA I – is to be implemented 
through sector reform programs. Sector budget support implemented through Sec-
tor Reform Contracts consists of the transfer of EC funds to the national treasury of 
a beneficiary country, in exchange for its commitments to implement certain policy 
measures and meet the agreed conditions or benchmarks. The instrument fits well to 
the “fundamentals first” logic of the revised EU enlargement strategy as it is aimed 
at supporting the EU candidates in the key reform areas, such as the rule of law, eco-
nomic governance, public administration reform and public financial management. 
There is, again, no doubt that sector budget support has many benefits, including a 
clearer link between the political agenda and financial resources, increased owner-
ship and improved domestic accountability, improved macroeconomic stability and 
the management of public finances, and lower transaction costs. On the other hand, 
the instrument seems to be less suitable for focused, accession-driven objectives 
that require the use of fine tune individual projects. What proportion of total IPA II 
funds should be channeled via a sector budget support instrument into an individual 
candidate country should, among other things, depend on its status in the EU acces-
sion process.
V. Conclusions
EU Enlargement Policy has been one of the most successful and influential poli-
cies of the EU. Not only has it overcome the Cold War differences among European 
states, but it also changed tremendously and in a very short period of time dozens 
of countries into modern European democracies. The negotiation process of Central 
and Eastern European countries proved to be a very powerful tool instrumental in 
those changes, but not a perfect one. Namely, it is imperfect in terms of the com-
plete alignment or mechanism of oversight after membership. Negotiating proce-
dures have to be adjusted to the needs of both the EU’s 28 members and Western 
Balkan states.
The role and attitudes of EU member states during the negotiation process are 
important technically, having in mind the large number of benchmarks (opening and 
closing, and in some cases even during the negotiation process) for which consensus 
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is needed. But consensus is never a technical issue – it is a deeply political one, and 
it is influenced not only by the assessment of the reform process of a candidate coun-
try. The general attitude towards enlargement as not being the priority of the EU, and 
especially, bilateral issues with the candidate country, have a much more important 
role. In other words, political consensus is much more difficult to reach and if there 
is no agreement, it is much easier to explain it with the technical objections.
Europeanization, the EU’s transformative power, still exists and offers a huge 
attraction for the Western Balkan countries. There is a strong message coming from 
EU member states that enlargement is going to continue and candidates are going to 
become members as soon as they fulfill the necessary conditions. At the same time, 
the business of negotiating accession is not as usual. “Acquired experience” of pre-
vious waves of enlargement (more bluntly, mistakes, leftovers and loose ends), find 
their expression in the New Approach to negotiations, with fundamentals first front 
loaded. In other words, the toughest issues first, and not to be left for the very end of 
the negotiation process. It is not clear what repercussions this will have on how long 
talks will last, but for sure it is clear that it affects the content. With the supremacy 
of the rule of law, the basis for the reforms is rightly established. This is, with no 
question, the good basis for working on European values, the corner stone of the EU.
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